v1.5.2: CF-peer validated client IP, grandfather migration, de-short-circuit register
Security follow-up to v1.5.1. Closes four items from the v1.5.1 review — two ship-blockers and two mediums — all within the ADR-0001 envelope. PSEC-007 — peptide_starter_get_client_ip() now trusts CF-Connecting-IP only when REMOTE_ADDR falls inside a published Cloudflare edge range. Previously, any direct-to-origin request (which Hostinger permits) could forge its rate-limit key by setting the header to a different IP per attempt, bypassing every abuse control in the theme. New module inc/cloudflare-ips.php embeds a dated snapshot of CF v4/v6 ranges and a CIDR matcher covering both families; list is overridable via the peptide_starter_cloudflare_ip_ranges filter for out-of-band updates. HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR stays ignored unless operators opt in via the peptide_starter_trust_xff filter. PSEC-008 — Removed the v1.5.1 user-verification migration (Option A as confirmed by peptiderepo). The sync-wp_mail-per-subscriber loop on admin_init would have blocked wp-admin and hammered deliverability. Existing accounts are now grandfathered: no ps_pending_verification meta = verified. Verification applies only to registrations from v1.5.2 forward. The ps_verify_migration_version option (written by v1.5.1) is cleared on theme activation. PSEC-009 — Registration validation no longer short-circuits. All five checks (username pattern, email validity, password length, username_exists, email_exists) evaluate unconditionally before the combined rejection. Closes the response-time oracle that let an attacker distinguish microsecond-fast regex rejection from DB-round-trip rejection and infer which field triggered the failure. PSEC-010 — Added the happy-path verify test that v1.5.1 was missing. Covers token match, user meta cleanup, auth cookie set, and the peptide_starter_user_verified action firing with the correct user ID. Seven new rate-limiter tests confirm CF-peer validation works end-to-end: trusted CF peer honours the header, untrusted peer ignores spoofed headers, invalid values fall through, XFF default-off, XFF filter opt-in, CF range filter override, IPv6 CIDR match, family mismatch rejection. Confirmed with peptiderepo before coding: (1) Option A for PSEC-008 because zero users; (2) Cloudflare IS in front of the origin (dig confirms 104.21.x / 172.67.x + CF-Ray response header), so PSEC-007 is a real fix not dead code; (3) no staging — treat prod as staging. ARCHITECTURE.md gains a client-IP trust model section; CONVENTIONS.md documents the header-trust rules for future modules. Version bumped to 1.5.2 in style.css and functions.php. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -137,6 +137,51 @@ class Test_Auth_Handlers extends WP_UnitTestCase {
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$this->assertSame( peptide_starter_register_failure_message(), $this->captured['data']['message'] );
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}
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/**
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* PSEC-009: registration validation path is not short-circuit.
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*
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* We can't directly mock `preg_match` / `username_exists` etc. from
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* userland. Instead, we assert the behavioural contract: even when an
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* early check has already failed (invalid username pattern), the
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* handler still runs the later DB-backed checks. We observe this by
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* filtering `pre_user_login` which wp_create_user-adjacent code paths
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* consult, and by checking that `username_exists` was called via a
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* filter it would fire. A simpler surrogate is to hook into WordPress'
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* `user_search_query` / `query` action and confirm at least one user
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* lookup happened during a failing registration — which would not
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* happen if the handler short-circuited on the pattern failure.
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*/
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public function test_register_runs_all_checks_even_when_early_one_fails() {
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$queries_ran = 0;
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$counter = function ( $query ) use ( &$queries_ran ) {
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// wp_cache_get avoids counting ourselves. We only care whether
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// any user-table-touching query fires during the handler run.
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if ( is_string( $query ) && false !== stripos( $query, 'users' ) ) {
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$queries_ran++;
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}
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return $query;
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};
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add_filter( 'query', $counter );
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update_option( 'users_can_register', 1 );
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$_POST = array(
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'ps_register_nonce' => wp_create_nonce( 'ps_auth_register' ),
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'username' => 'ab', // Too short — early check fails.
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'email' => 'validformat@example.com',
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'password' => 'longenoughpassword',
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);
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try { peptide_starter_ajax_register(); } catch ( WPAjaxDieStopException $e ) { /* ok */ }
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remove_filter( 'query', $counter );
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$this->assertGreaterThan(
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0,
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$queries_ran,
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'username_exists / email_exists must still run even when pattern check fails (PSEC-009 non-short-circuit).'
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);
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$this->assertSame( peptide_starter_register_failure_message(), $this->captured['data']['message'] );
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}
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public function test_register_duplicate_email_returns_unified_message() {
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self::factory()->user->create( array( 'user_email' => 'dup@example.com' ) );
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update_option( 'users_can_register', 1 );
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