Files
peptide-starter-theme/tests/test-auth-handlers.php
peptiderepo fff3fce432 v1.5.2: CF-peer validated client IP, grandfather migration, de-short-circuit register
Security follow-up to v1.5.1. Closes four items from the v1.5.1 review —
two ship-blockers and two mediums — all within the ADR-0001 envelope.

PSEC-007 — peptide_starter_get_client_ip() now trusts CF-Connecting-IP
only when REMOTE_ADDR falls inside a published Cloudflare edge range.
Previously, any direct-to-origin request (which Hostinger permits) could
forge its rate-limit key by setting the header to a different IP per
attempt, bypassing every abuse control in the theme. New module
inc/cloudflare-ips.php embeds a dated snapshot of CF v4/v6 ranges and a
CIDR matcher covering both families; list is overridable via the
peptide_starter_cloudflare_ip_ranges filter for out-of-band updates.
HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR stays ignored unless operators opt in via the
peptide_starter_trust_xff filter.

PSEC-008 — Removed the v1.5.1 user-verification migration (Option A as
confirmed by peptiderepo). The sync-wp_mail-per-subscriber loop on
admin_init would have blocked wp-admin and hammered deliverability.
Existing accounts are now grandfathered: no ps_pending_verification
meta = verified. Verification applies only to registrations from v1.5.2
forward. The ps_verify_migration_version option (written by v1.5.1) is
cleared on theme activation.

PSEC-009 — Registration validation no longer short-circuits. All five
checks (username pattern, email validity, password length,
username_exists, email_exists) evaluate unconditionally before the
combined rejection. Closes the response-time oracle that let an
attacker distinguish microsecond-fast regex rejection from DB-round-trip
rejection and infer which field triggered the failure.

PSEC-010 — Added the happy-path verify test that v1.5.1 was missing.
Covers token match, user meta cleanup, auth cookie set, and the
peptide_starter_user_verified action firing with the correct user ID.

Seven new rate-limiter tests confirm CF-peer validation works
end-to-end: trusted CF peer honours the header, untrusted peer ignores
spoofed headers, invalid values fall through, XFF default-off, XFF
filter opt-in, CF range filter override, IPv6 CIDR match, family
mismatch rejection.

Confirmed with peptiderepo before coding: (1) Option A for PSEC-008
because zero users; (2) Cloudflare IS in front of the origin (dig
confirms 104.21.x / 172.67.x + CF-Ray response header), so PSEC-007 is
a real fix not dead code; (3) no staging — treat prod as staging.

ARCHITECTURE.md gains a client-IP trust model section; CONVENTIONS.md
documents the header-trust rules for future modules.

Version bumped to 1.5.2 in style.css and functions.php.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-14 15:39:09 +07:00

198 lines
7.1 KiB
PHP

<?php
/**
* Tests for inc/auth-handlers.php.
*
* Covers: unified error messages, rate limiting, nonce failure,
* honeypot drop, enumeration resistance.
*
* @package peptide-starter
*/
/**
* @runTestsInSeparateProcesses disabled — WP_UnitTestCase handles isolation.
*/
class Test_Auth_Handlers extends WP_UnitTestCase {
/**
* Capture wp_send_json_{success,error} via wp_die_handler so tests can
* assert on the response without ending the PHP process.
*
* @var array|null
*/
protected $captured = null;
public function set_up() {
parent::set_up();
$this->captured = null;
// Swap wp_die into a throwable we can catch.
add_filter( 'wp_die_ajax_handler', array( $this, 'get_die_handler' ) );
add_filter( 'wp_die_handler', array( $this, 'get_die_handler' ) );
// Capture the JSON body via the wp_json_encode filter path.
add_filter(
'wp_json_encode_data',
function ( $data ) {
$this->captured = $data;
return $data;
}
);
}
public function tear_down() {
remove_all_filters( 'wp_die_ajax_handler' );
remove_all_filters( 'wp_die_handler' );
remove_all_filters( 'wp_json_encode_data' );
global $wpdb;
$wpdb->query( "DELETE FROM {$wpdb->options} WHERE option_name LIKE '_transient_ps_rl_%'" );
$wpdb->query( "DELETE FROM {$wpdb->options} WHERE option_name LIKE '_transient_timeout_ps_rl_%'" );
$_POST = array();
parent::tear_down();
}
public function get_die_handler() {
return array( $this, 'throwing_die' );
}
public function throwing_die( $message = '', $title = '', $args = array() ) {
throw new WPAjaxDieStopException( is_scalar( $message ) ? (string) $message : wp_json_encode( $message ) );
}
/**
* Run the login handler and return the captured response, if any.
*/
protected function invoke_login() {
try {
peptide_starter_ajax_login();
} catch ( WPAjaxDieStopException $e ) {
// Expected — JSON was sent.
return;
}
}
public function test_login_missing_nonce_rejects_with_security_message() {
$_POST = array( 'email' => 'a@b.com', 'password' => 'whatever' );
$this->invoke_login();
$this->assertIsArray( $this->captured );
$this->assertFalse( $this->captured['success'] );
$this->assertStringContainsString( 'Security check', $this->captured['data']['message'] );
}
public function test_login_unknown_email_returns_unified_message() {
$_POST = array(
'ps_login_nonce' => wp_create_nonce( 'ps_auth_login' ),
'email' => 'nobody-' . wp_generate_password( 8, false ) . '@example.com',
'password' => 'wrong-password',
);
$this->invoke_login();
$this->assertSame( peptide_starter_login_failure_message(), $this->captured['data']['message'] );
}
public function test_login_wrong_password_returns_unified_message() {
$user = self::factory()->user->create_and_get( array( 'user_pass' => 'correct-horse-battery' ) );
$_POST = array(
'ps_login_nonce' => wp_create_nonce( 'ps_auth_login' ),
'email' => $user->user_email,
'password' => 'definitely-wrong',
);
$this->invoke_login();
$this->assertSame( peptide_starter_login_failure_message(), $this->captured['data']['message'] );
}
public function test_login_honeypot_tripped_returns_fake_success() {
$_POST = array(
'ps_login_nonce' => wp_create_nonce( 'ps_auth_login' ),
'email' => 'a@b.com',
'password' => 'x',
'ps_hp_login' => 'botfill',
);
$this->invoke_login();
$this->assertTrue( $this->captured['success'], 'Honeypot must silently fake success.' );
}
public function test_login_rate_limit_exceeded_still_returns_unified_message() {
// Exhaust the budget.
$config = peptide_starter_config_rate_limit( 'login' );
for ( $i = 0; $i < $config['limit']; $i++ ) {
Peptide_Starter_Rate_Limiter::record( 'login', peptide_starter_hash_identifier( 'same@same.com' ) );
}
$_POST = array(
'ps_login_nonce' => wp_create_nonce( 'ps_auth_login' ),
'email' => 'same@same.com',
'password' => 'anything',
);
$this->invoke_login();
$this->assertSame( peptide_starter_login_failure_message(), $this->captured['data']['message'] );
}
public function test_register_invalid_username_returns_unified_message() {
$_POST = array(
'ps_register_nonce' => wp_create_nonce( 'ps_auth_register' ),
'username' => 'ab',
'email' => 'newuser@example.com',
'password' => 'longenoughpassword',
);
update_option( 'users_can_register', 1 );
try { peptide_starter_ajax_register(); } catch ( WPAjaxDieStopException $e ) { /* ok */ }
$this->assertSame( peptide_starter_register_failure_message(), $this->captured['data']['message'] );
}
/**
* PSEC-009: registration validation path is not short-circuit.
*
* We can't directly mock `preg_match` / `username_exists` etc. from
* userland. Instead, we assert the behavioural contract: even when an
* early check has already failed (invalid username pattern), the
* handler still runs the later DB-backed checks. We observe this by
* filtering `pre_user_login` which wp_create_user-adjacent code paths
* consult, and by checking that `username_exists` was called via a
* filter it would fire. A simpler surrogate is to hook into WordPress'
* `user_search_query` / `query` action and confirm at least one user
* lookup happened during a failing registration — which would not
* happen if the handler short-circuited on the pattern failure.
*/
public function test_register_runs_all_checks_even_when_early_one_fails() {
$queries_ran = 0;
$counter = function ( $query ) use ( &$queries_ran ) {
// wp_cache_get avoids counting ourselves. We only care whether
// any user-table-touching query fires during the handler run.
if ( is_string( $query ) && false !== stripos( $query, 'users' ) ) {
$queries_ran++;
}
return $query;
};
add_filter( 'query', $counter );
update_option( 'users_can_register', 1 );
$_POST = array(
'ps_register_nonce' => wp_create_nonce( 'ps_auth_register' ),
'username' => 'ab', // Too short — early check fails.
'email' => 'validformat@example.com',
'password' => 'longenoughpassword',
);
try { peptide_starter_ajax_register(); } catch ( WPAjaxDieStopException $e ) { /* ok */ }
remove_filter( 'query', $counter );
$this->assertGreaterThan(
0,
$queries_ran,
'username_exists / email_exists must still run even when pattern check fails (PSEC-009 non-short-circuit).'
);
$this->assertSame( peptide_starter_register_failure_message(), $this->captured['data']['message'] );
}
public function test_register_duplicate_email_returns_unified_message() {
self::factory()->user->create( array( 'user_email' => 'dup@example.com' ) );
update_option( 'users_can_register', 1 );
$_POST = array(
'ps_register_nonce' => wp_create_nonce( 'ps_auth_register' ),
'username' => 'newusername',
'email' => 'dup@example.com',
'password' => 'longenoughpassword',
);
try { peptide_starter_ajax_register(); } catch ( WPAjaxDieStopException $e ) { /* ok */ }
$this->assertSame( peptide_starter_register_failure_message(), $this->captured['data']['message'] );
}
}