Files
peptide-starter-theme/inc/rate-limiter.php
peptiderepo fff3fce432 v1.5.2: CF-peer validated client IP, grandfather migration, de-short-circuit register
Security follow-up to v1.5.1. Closes four items from the v1.5.1 review —
two ship-blockers and two mediums — all within the ADR-0001 envelope.

PSEC-007 — peptide_starter_get_client_ip() now trusts CF-Connecting-IP
only when REMOTE_ADDR falls inside a published Cloudflare edge range.
Previously, any direct-to-origin request (which Hostinger permits) could
forge its rate-limit key by setting the header to a different IP per
attempt, bypassing every abuse control in the theme. New module
inc/cloudflare-ips.php embeds a dated snapshot of CF v4/v6 ranges and a
CIDR matcher covering both families; list is overridable via the
peptide_starter_cloudflare_ip_ranges filter for out-of-band updates.
HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR stays ignored unless operators opt in via the
peptide_starter_trust_xff filter.

PSEC-008 — Removed the v1.5.1 user-verification migration (Option A as
confirmed by peptiderepo). The sync-wp_mail-per-subscriber loop on
admin_init would have blocked wp-admin and hammered deliverability.
Existing accounts are now grandfathered: no ps_pending_verification
meta = verified. Verification applies only to registrations from v1.5.2
forward. The ps_verify_migration_version option (written by v1.5.1) is
cleared on theme activation.

PSEC-009 — Registration validation no longer short-circuits. All five
checks (username pattern, email validity, password length,
username_exists, email_exists) evaluate unconditionally before the
combined rejection. Closes the response-time oracle that let an
attacker distinguish microsecond-fast regex rejection from DB-round-trip
rejection and infer which field triggered the failure.

PSEC-010 — Added the happy-path verify test that v1.5.1 was missing.
Covers token match, user meta cleanup, auth cookie set, and the
peptide_starter_user_verified action firing with the correct user ID.

Seven new rate-limiter tests confirm CF-peer validation works
end-to-end: trusted CF peer honours the header, untrusted peer ignores
spoofed headers, invalid values fall through, XFF default-off, XFF
filter opt-in, CF range filter override, IPv6 CIDR match, family
mismatch rejection.

Confirmed with peptiderepo before coding: (1) Option A for PSEC-008
because zero users; (2) Cloudflare IS in front of the origin (dig
confirms 104.21.x / 172.67.x + CF-Ray response header), so PSEC-007 is
a real fix not dead code; (3) no staging — treat prod as staging.

ARCHITECTURE.md gains a client-IP trust model section; CONVENTIONS.md
documents the header-trust rules for future modules.

Version bumped to 1.5.2 in style.css and functions.php.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-14 15:39:09 +07:00

168 lines
6.0 KiB
PHP

<?php
/**
* Transient-backed Rate Limiter + Trustworthy Client IP
*
* Generic check/record/reset limiter used by every public endpoint
* (login, register, contact, newsletter, verify-resend). State lives
* in WordPress transients — auto-expires, no cleanup required.
*
* Storage key format: ps_rl_{action}_{hash} where
* hash = substr( wp_hash( $ip . '|' . $identifier ), 0, 16 ).
* Raw IPs are never stored.
*
* @see inc/config.php — supplies per-action limit + window.
* @see inc/cloudflare-ips.php — edge-range allowlist for CF-Connecting-IP trust.
* @see inc/auth-handlers.php, inc/contact-handler.php — primary callers.
* @see functions.php — includes this file.
*
* What: Rate limit check/record/reset + peer-validated client-IP resolver.
* Who calls it: Every public handler after nonce verification.
* Dependencies: WordPress transients, inc/config.php, inc/cloudflare-ips.php.
*
* @package peptide-starter
*/
// Exit if accessed directly.
if ( ! defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) {
exit;
}
/**
* Static rate limiter using WordPress transients.
*
* What: Tracks attempt counts per (action, identifier) tuple.
* Who calls it: Public handlers after nonce verification.
* Dependencies: Transient storage, peptide_starter_security_config().
*/
class Peptide_Starter_Rate_Limiter {
/**
* Build the transient key for a given action + identifier.
*
* Uses a truncated wp_hash so the stored key never exposes the raw IP
* or raw identifier. 16 hex chars ≈ 64 bits of collision resistance.
*
* @param string $action Action slug (e.g. 'login').
* @param string $identifier Extra identifier (email hash, form slug, etc.).
* @return string Transient key, always prefixed ps_rl_.
*/
protected static function build_key( $action, $identifier ) {
$ip = peptide_starter_get_client_ip();
$hash = substr( wp_hash( $ip . '|' . $identifier ), 0, 16 );
return 'ps_rl_' . preg_replace( '/[^a-z0-9_]/i', '', $action ) . '_' . $hash;
}
/**
* Whether the caller is still within their budget.
*
* Does not mutate state — call record() on failure (or at the start of
* every attempt if you want to meter successes too).
*
* @param string $action Action slug configured in security config.
* @param string $identifier Caller-supplied identifier (e.g. sha256(email)).
* @return bool True if allowed, false if over budget.
*/
public static function check( $action, $identifier ) {
$limits = peptide_starter_config_rate_limit( $action );
$key = self::build_key( $action, $identifier );
$current = (int) get_transient( $key );
return $current < $limits['limit'];
}
/**
* Record an attempt — increments the counter, sets TTL on first write.
*
* Side effects: writes a transient.
*
* @param string $action Action slug.
* @param string $identifier Caller-supplied identifier.
* @return void
*/
public static function record( $action, $identifier ) {
$limits = peptide_starter_config_rate_limit( $action );
$key = self::build_key( $action, $identifier );
$current = (int) get_transient( $key );
set_transient( $key, $current + 1, $limits['window'] );
}
/**
* Clear the counter for an action + identifier.
*
* Side effects: deletes a transient.
*
* @param string $action Action slug.
* @param string $identifier Caller-supplied identifier.
* @return void
*/
public static function reset( $action, $identifier ) {
$key = self::build_key( $action, $identifier );
delete_transient( $key );
}
}
/**
* Resolve the client IP we will trust for rate-limit keying.
*
* Trust model (v1.5.2):
* - REMOTE_ADDR is the ground truth — it is always returned as the
* fallback and cannot be forged by a client.
* - HTTP_CF_CONNECTING_IP is trusted ONLY when REMOTE_ADDR is a known
* Cloudflare edge (see inc/cloudflare-ips.php). If the origin is
* reached directly (bypassing CF), attackers could otherwise spoof
* any IP they liked and bypass every rate limiter.
* - HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR is ignored by default. Operators who run
* behind a different trusted proxy can opt-in via the
* peptide_starter_trust_xff filter returning true.
*
* Invalid / unparseable header values are silently ignored.
*
* @return string Validated IPv4/IPv6 string; '0.0.0.0' only if REMOTE_ADDR
* is empty or unparseable (shouldn't happen in practice).
*/
function peptide_starter_get_client_ip() {
$remote_raw = isset( $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ) ) : '';
$remote = filter_var( $remote_raw, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP ) ? $remote_raw : '0.0.0.0';
// CF-Connecting-IP — only trusted when the peer itself is a CF edge.
if ( ! empty( $_SERVER['HTTP_CF_CONNECTING_IP'] )
&& function_exists( 'peptide_starter_is_cloudflare_peer' )
&& peptide_starter_is_cloudflare_peer( $remote ) ) {
$cf = sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['HTTP_CF_CONNECTING_IP'] ) );
if ( filter_var( $cf, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP ) ) {
/**
* Filter the resolved client IP.
*
* @param string $ip Resolved IP.
*/
return apply_filters( 'peptide_starter_client_ip', $cf );
}
}
/**
* Whether to trust HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR. Off by default — only enable
* when a known, trusted non-CF proxy sits in front of the origin.
*
* @param bool $trust Default false.
*/
$trust_xff = (bool) apply_filters( 'peptide_starter_trust_xff', false );
if ( $trust_xff && ! empty( $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'] ) ) {
$xff = sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'] ) );
$first = trim( explode( ',', $xff )[0] );
if ( filter_var( $first, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP ) ) {
return apply_filters( 'peptide_starter_client_ip', $first );
}
}
return apply_filters( 'peptide_starter_client_ip', $remote );
}
/**
* Hash an identifier for rate-limit keying without storing plaintext.
*
* @param string $value Raw identifier.
* @return string 32-char hex substring of a sha256.
*/
function peptide_starter_hash_identifier( $value ) {
return substr( hash( 'sha256', (string) $value ), 0, 32 );
}